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THE writer's interest in the conflict of laws coextends substantially with the life of the Michigan Law Review. This may be some 
excuse for attempting to trace some of the developments in this field in 
the intervening years. Let us consider first what has happened in this 
country and thereupon what has occurred in the rest of the world. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
If one compares the place of the conflict of laws in the law school 
curricula of today with its position at the beginning of the century, one 
observes a very marked change. Through Professor Beale the conflict 
of laws became, since r 894, one of the major and most popular courses 
at the Harvard Law School, and as the influence of that school spread 
over the country, it carried with it an enthusiastic interest in this sub-
ject. Through Professor Beale's influence also one of the first subjects 
to be restated by the American Law Institute was that of the conflict 
of laws, with Professor Beale as Reporter. After ten years of unremit-
ting labor the Restatement of this subject was brought to a conclusion 
in I934· In this Restatement we have the most detailed collection of 
rules of the conflict of laws to be found in any country.1 
Characteristic of the American conflict of laws is that it is applicable 
both between the different states of this country and between this coun-
try and foreign countries; that is, it has both an interstate and an 
*Professor of Law, Yale University Law School. Ph.B., LL.B., Cornell; J.U.D., 
Gottingen. Author, CAsEs ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws (4th ed. 1937), THE CoNFLICT 
oF LAws RELATING TO BILLS AND NOTEs (1918), and numerous articles in legal 
periodicals.-£ d. 
- 1 The Conflict of Laws Restatement contains 625 sections. The Code Bustamante 
(Pan-American Code of Private International Law), covering a wider field, has 437 
sections. 
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international aspect,2 Characteristic of our system of the conflict of 
laws is likewise that the authority of the individual states to lay down 
conflicts rules is subject to .various limitations imposed by the Consti-
tution of the United States as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Text-
books on the conflict of laws published prior to 1902 scarcely touched 
upon the constitutional aspects of the subject, except in connection with 
the jurisdiction of courts and the enforcement of judgments of sister 
states. Beale's casebook on the conflict of laws followed the same 
trend. How different the latest edition of the casebook on that subject 
by Cheatham, Dowling, Goodrich and Griswold! Forty years ago it 
appeared that the states and their courts were practically free to adopt 
the rules of the conflict of laws deemed most convenient. During the 
last twenty-five years the Supreme Court has invoked the full faith and 
credit clause, the due process clause and other clauses of the United 
States Constitution in an increasing number of cases to limit the power 
of the legislatures and courts in this regard, so that the question came to 
be asked whether the conflict of laws in this country had become a part 
of constitutionallaw.8 Late decisions of the Supreme Court would sug-
gest that the Court as now constituted may be disposed to call a halt to 
the movement alluded to. 4 
From early times the question has been whether our federal courts 
should follow the rules of the conflict of laws obtaining in the states in 
which they sit so that there might be uniformity of decision between the 
federal and state courts in the same state, or whether the federal courts 
should develop conflict of laws rules of their own so as to secure uni-
formity between the federal courts of this country. As early as 1842 
the case of Swift v. Tyson 5 decided that the federal courts were not 
bound by the state rules in matters of general law, from which it fol-
lowed that they were not compelled to follow the conflict of laws rules 
of any state.6 This long-established doctrine was overthrown in 1938/ 
2 See Du Bois, "The Significance in Conflict of Laws of the Distinction between 
Interstate and International Transactions," 17 MINN. L. REv. 361 (1933). 
3 Ross, "Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?" 
15 MINN. L. REv. 161 (1931). 
4 See especially Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 4-98, 61 S. Ct. 1023 (194-1). 
5 16 Pet. (4-1 U.S.) 1 (184-2). 
6 Thus, up to 1938 the federal courts required the existence of reciprocity for 
the enforcement of judgments of foreign courts, Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 16 
S. Ct. 139 (1895), whereas the state courts regarded them generally as conclusive. 
Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 24-2 N. Y. 381, 152 N. E. 121 
(1926); Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N.Y. S. 
284- (1926), a.ffd. 24-6 N.Y. 603, 159 N. E. 669 (1927). 
7 Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304- U.S. 64-, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938). 
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and it is now the duty of the federal courts to follow the conflict of 
laws rules of the states in which they sit. 8 This obligation exists, of 
course, only to the extent that the state has the power to adopt its own 
rules of the conflict of laws, free from any constitutional restraint. 
In the matter of the jurisdiction of courts, our law has approached 
during the last forty years to a certain extent the continental point of 
view. On the continent of Europe and in Latin America a person may 
be sued upon any personal cause of action at his domicile and in other 
places with which the transaction is deemed to have a sufficient con-
nection. In this country there were recognized forty years ago only two 
general bases of jurisdiction in personal actions, resting on personal 
service or consent. A third basis-that of domicile-was adopted in 
some states by statute, which conferred power upon the courts to enter 
a personal judgment upon constructive service against a defendant who 
was domiciled in the state, but in some states the validity of such legis-
lation was challenged by the courts.9 The Supreme Court of the United 
States did not pass upon the question until I 940 when it sustained the 
power of the legislatures to confer such jurisdiction.10 
The rapid increase in business carried on by foreign corporations 
and nonresident individuals early induced the legislatures of the various 
states to confer jurisdiction upon their courts over causes of action aris-
ing out of such business. Forty years ago our courts still relied on the 
consent theory to sustain such legislation with respect to foreign cor-
porations. Since then, and especially since the decision of International 
Harvester Company v. Kentucky 11 the consent theory proved insuf-
ficient, whereupon the presence theory came into being.12 This theory 
in turn does not solve the problem.18 The view is finding more and 
more acceptance today that, where contract or tort obligations are in-
8 Sampson v. Channell, (C. C. A. Ist, 1940) IIO F. (2) 754, cert. den. 310 
U. S. 650, 6o S. Ct. 1099 (1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 
U. S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 
1023 (1941). 
9 See De la Montanya v. De la Montanya, II2 Cal. 101, 44 P. 345 (1896); Moss 
v. Fitch, 212 Mo. 484, III s. W. 475 (1908); Raher v. Raher, 150 Iowa 5II, 129 
N. W. 494 (19II); McCormick v. Blaine, 345 Ill. 461, 178 N. E. 195 (1931). 
10 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 339 (1940). In McDonald v. 
Mabie, 243 U. S. 90, 37 S. Ct. 343 (1917), the case went off on the due process 
clause, the best practicable mode of constructive service not having been used. 
11 234 U.S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944 (1914). 
12 See International Harvester Co. v. Ky., 234 U.S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944 (1914); 
People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 38 S. Ct. 233 (1918). 
18 See remarks of Judge Learned Hand in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 
(C. C. A. 2d, 1930) 45 F. (2d) 139· 
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curred in connection with the business of foreign corporations or non-
resident individuals, it is only fair that the parties injured should be 
able to obtain redress through the courts of the state where the business 
is carried on instead of being able to bring suit only in the home state 
of the foreign corporation or nonresident.14 
As long as jurisdiction over foreign corporations was predicated 
upon the theory of implied consent, the privilege and immunities clause 
seemed to present an insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of juris-
diction over nonresident citizens, for the reason that whereas foreign 
corporations could be excluded from doing business in the state or ad-
mitted upon terms, citizens of other states could noe11 This difficulty 
disappears if the latest theory of jurisdiction referred to above is recog-
nized. 
As regards damage caused by automobiles of nonresidents, it is now 
settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States that 
a state may confer jurisdiction upon its courts by authorizing service 
upon some state official as the representative of the nonresident owner 
and requiring that the owner be notified of the pendency of the suit, 
generally by registered mail.16 The police power of the states over their 
roads has been invoked as a legal justification for the exercise of this 
exceptional mode of jurisdiction. The Restatement of the Conflict 
of Laws 17 would go beyond and recognize the powe:J; of states to assume 
jurisdiction over causes of action arising out of any act done in the 
state, provided some reasonable mode of constructive service be re-
quired. The recognition of such a formula would extend the juris-
diction of our courts even beyond the accepted theories in continental 
and Latin-American countries. The Supreme Court of the United 
States has not as yet approved such a broad doctrine. 
Jurisdiction in rem over interests in land presents no serious prob-
lem in the conflict of laws. With respect to chattels, difficulties arise 
when they are brought into a state without the owner's consent 18 or 
where the chattel is represented by a negotiable bill of lading or ware-
14 The troublesome question as to what constitutes doing "business" and the fur-
ther question whether a corporation conducting a continuous business in a state should 
not, upon proper notice, be subject to suit with respect to causes of action arising out 
of foreign transactions still remain. See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, (C. C. A. 2d, 
1930) 45 F. (2d) 139. 
111 See Fle:xner v. Farson, 24-8 U.S. 289, 39 S. Ct. 97 (1918). 
16 Hess v. Pawloski, 274- U. S. 352, 4-7 S. Ct. 632 (1927); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 
276 U. S. 13, 4-8 S. Ct. 259 (1928). 
17 Sec. 84- (1934-). 
18 See CoNFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT, §§ 102, 103, and caveat (1934-). 
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house receipt which is in another state.19 No :final conclusions have been 
reached by our courts in these matters. As regards intangibles, Profes-
sor Beale has contended that in the nature of things jurisdiction in rem 
is impossible.2° Courts and legislatures have not taken this view, how-
ever, and have assumed jurisdiction under varying circumstances. The 
matter was brought before the Supreme Court of the United States 
in I 90 5 in a case where the local legislature allowed the garnishment 
of a debt owed by a nonresident debtor, which was neither contracted 
nor payable in the state.21 The Supreme Court allowed the exercise of 
jurisdiction, provided the principal debtor was suable in the state, and 
stated that the garnishee could set up the garnishment proceedings and 
payment thereunder as a defense in a suit by his creditor only if he 
had notified him of the pendency of garnishment proceedings or if his 
creditor had otherwise learned of the proceedings in time to put up any 
defense. 
Where the debt or other intangible interest is represented by a note, 
bill or stock certificate, the question has been raised whether the docu-
ment can be proceeded against in rem on the ground that it has incor-
porated the chose in action. A considerable number of decisions has 
been rendered on the point during the last forty years, but there is still 
much confusion in our law on the subject.22 There is some trend in 
favor of allowing such a proceeding in the state in which the certificate 
is found. 
Some new developments have taken place since I 900 in the en-
forcement of judgments of sister states. For example, it has become 
settled that a state may not decline to enforce such judgments on the 
ground of public policy.23 The Supreme Court of the United States 
has held likewise that tax judgments, like any other judgments for the 
payment of money/4 are entitled to full faith and credit. A most strik-
ing development has been in the direction of extending the doctrine 
of res judicata. Until recently the defense of lack of jurisdiction was 
available in a suit upon the judgment of a sister state. This defense was 
19 Heldendall, "The Res In Transitu and Similar Problems in the Conflict of 
Laws," 17 CAN. B. REv. 7, 105 (1939). 
20 Beale, "The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt," 
27 HARV. L. REv. 107 (1913). 
21 See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 25 S. Ct. 625 (1905). 
22 See Andrews, "Situs of Intangibles in Suits against Nonresident Claimants," 49 
YALE L. J. 241 (1939)· 
28 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 28 S. Ct. 641 (1908); Roche v. McDon-
ald, 275 U. S. 449, 48 S. Ct. 14.2 (1927). 
24 Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 56 S. Ct. 229 (1935). 
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cut off by the Supreme Court, however, in 1931 with respect to juris-
diction over the person, 25 and still more recently in various cases in-
volving jurisdiction over the subject matter, where the defendant had 
litigated the question of jurisdiction in the lower court.26 
Disputes regarding the status of foreign equitable decrees for the 
payment of money were set at rest early in this country by statutes 
which placed them on the same footing with judgments at law.27 
Whether an equitable decree for the doing of some act other than the 
payment of money creates an obligation which is entitled to full faith 
and credit, or if not, should be enforced on principles of the conflict of 
laws, or whether it constitutes merely a conclusive determination of 
the equities of the case which the other courts must respect, is not yet 
finally determined.28 
Arbitration agreements have been regarded in this country as valid 
but unenforceable, that is revocable at any time before an award was 
rendered. The revocability rule was first changed in New Y ark in 
I 920 by statute and thereupon in other states. Congress enacted the 
United States Arbitration Act, in force since 1926, which is applicable 
to suits arising in admiralty and in foreign and interstate commerce, 
except contracts of employment. The legislation with respect to arbi-
tration is so recent that no major developments from the standpoint of 
the conflict of laws can as yet be recorded. The greatest contrast be-
tween our law and that of all other countries consists in the fact that 
according to our courts the enforcement of foreign arbitration agree-
ments relates to procedure instead of to the substantive rights of the 
parties.29 
Courts have declined to enforce the laws of foreign states or coun-
tries normally applicable when they were sufficiently. distasteful to 
them. In such a case they are wont to say that the enforcement of the 
foreign law is contrary to the public policy of the forum. Writing in 
1918,S0 Judge Beach contended that such a doctrine had no place be-
25 Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U. S. 522, 51 S. Ct. 517 
(1931). . 
2c Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3 (1938); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining 
Co., 308 U.S. 66, 6oS. Ct. 44 (1939). 
27 See Post v. Neafie, 3 Caines (N.Y.) 22 (1805). 
28 See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. I, 30 S. Ct. 3 (1909), especially concurring 
opinion by Justice Holmes, and CoNFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT, §§ 447, 450 
(1934)· 
29 Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C. R. Co., 2II N. Y. 346, 105 N. E. 653 
(1914); Lorenzen, "Commercial Arbitration-International and Interstate Aspects," 
43 YALE L. J. 716 (1934). 
80 Beach, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights," 27 YALE L. J. 656 
(1918). 
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tween the states of this country. Although the tendency to narrow the 
public policy doctrine has continued during the last forty years,31 it has 
still the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States.82 But 
what is the legal effect of the application of the public policy doctrine? 
May the plaintiff who is denied recovery because the enforcement of a 
claim is deemed to be against the public policy of the forum sue the 
defendant again in some other state, on the ground that the first judg-
ment affected merely matters of procedure and for that reason is not res 
judicata? Brandeis has given an affirmative answer to this question,88 
but there is authority to the contrary.84 So far as the public policy doc-
trine can be invoked against a defendant, by excluding his defense,85 
he is clearly out of luck, for the judgment against him is conclusive. 
To what extent the full faith and credit to be accorded to the public 
acts of sister states will be held to restrict the power of the courts of the 
forum to invoke their public policy doctrine in cases of this sort cannot 
be stated with any degree of assurance. 
Until 1910 courts and writers in this country were unaware that 
differences in the conflict of laws rules of two countries raised a prob-
lem which had been debated a great deal on the continent, viz. whether 
the conflict of laws rules of the forum should be deemed to refer to the 
law of the foreign country inclusive of its conflict of laws rules or ex-
clusive of such rules.36 The problem is technically known as that of 
renvoi. If the courts apply foreign conflict of laws rules, they are said to 
adopt the renvoi.87 We have no decisions as yet clearly supporting the 
renvoi doctrine.88 Griswold 89 would justify it in the interest of uniform-
ity if the courts of the forum would decide the case in the same manner 
as the courts of the foreign country. Such uniformity would be achieved, 
however, only between countries having the same conflict of laws rule 
81 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918). 
82 Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U. S. 412, 38 S. Ct. 147 {1918); Griffin 
v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 1023 (1941). 
83 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 at 160, 52 S. Ct. 
571 (1932). 
84 Roller v. Murray, 71 W. Va. 161, 76 S. E. 172 (1912). 
85 See Fox v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 138 Wis. 648, 120 N. W. 399 {1909). 
86 See Lorenzen, "The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law," 10 
CoL. L. REv. 190, 327 (1910). 
87 It may lead either to the application of the law of the forum {case of remission) 
or to that of another state or country {case of transmission). 
88 The only decision in this country in which the matter is fully discussed is that 
of In re Tallmadge, 109 Misc. 696, 181 N. Y. ~· 336 (1919), decided by the Sur-
rogates Court of New York County. The court reached the conclusion that the renvoi 
doctrine had no place in our law. 
89 Griswold, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 HARv. L. REV. I165 (1938). 
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and then only if the courts of the foreign country would reject Gris-
wold's version of the renvoi doctrine/0 
Although the courts in question have the same rules of the conflict 
of laws, different meanings may be attached thereto. For 'example, 
both may apply the law of domicile in the case of intestate succession 
regarding movables but their notions of domicile may vary. Again, 
both may say that the law of the place where the contract is made gov-
erns its validity and yet reach different conclusions when the contract is 
made by correspondence as regards the place of contracting. This prob-
lem is part of what is technically known as the qualification, classifica-
tion or characterization problem. The first article on this subject writ-
ten in English appeared in !920.41 On the continent the subject has 
aroused the interest of a large number of jurists who have enlarged its 
scope to such an extent as to cover practically the entire subject of the 
conflict of laws. Under such circumstances no useful statement of a 
general character can be made regarding it. In a second article I at-
tempted to limit the problem so as to keep it within proper bounds.42 
Professor Cook quotes a portion of my article and says that the argu-
ments there used "make no sense in any usable terminology" of legal 
logic.43 I agree, but it ought to have been apparent that the arguments 
advanced by me were not intended to express my own point of view 
on the subject of substance and procedure« but the kind of reasoning 
usually indulged in by our courts. 
40 If A, a citizen of State X, dies domiciled in State Y and State X distributes 
personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile and State Y 
in accordance with the law of nationality, under the Griswold formula uniformity 
would actually be obtained only with respect to countries adopting the law of domicile 
in the distribution of personal property upon death. They would all distribute the 
property as the courts of Y would do. Courts distributing the property in accordance 
with the national law of the decedent would distribute it as the courts of State X would 
do. Such uniformity in each group could be achieved only if the courts of the foreign 
country whose law is applicable reject the Griswold formula and use the renvoi as an 
excuse for applying the law of the forum. If they were to accept the Griswold formula, 
they would fall into circular reasoning from which there would be no logical escape,-
the courts of X would have to distribute the property as it would be distributed by the 
courts of State Y and the courts of State Y would have to distribute it as the courts 
of State X. 
41 Lorenzen, "The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws," 20 CoL. 
L. REv. 247 (1920). 
42 Lorenzen, "The Qualification, Classification, or Characterization Problem in the 
Conflict of Laws," 50 YALE L. J. 743 (1941). 
48 Cook, "'Characterization' in the Conflict of Laws," 51 YALE L. J. 191 at 198 
(1941). 
44 See Lorenzen, "The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," 3 2 YALE 
L. J. 311 (1923). 
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Besides the renvoi theory and the qualification problem, the notion 
of fraud upon the law has aroused considerable interest on the continent 
in modern times, especially in France. In this country there are isolated 
instances in which courts have dealt with the problem, especially in 
the case of marriage and divorce, but no attempt has been made to 
develop general theories regarding it.45 ' 
The courts of all countries will enforce only foreign substantive 
rights and not foreign rules of procedure. This is in accordance with the 
necessity of the situation, for the courts of one state cannot use the legal 
machinery of the state governing the right in question. In the nature 
of things courts enforce all causes of action only in accordance with the 
local legal machinery. Matters of procedure, pleading and rules of 
evidence are, therefore, naturally governed by the law of the forum, 
although they may affect the decision in a particular case. Anglo-
American courts, however, have not drawn the line as indicated above 
and have called matters procedural in the conflict of laws because they 
had been so regarded for other purposes. The line between substance 
and procedure is a flexible one and can be drawn in different places in 
accordance with the objectives in view, so that the label "procedure" 
attached to a matter in other branches of the law is not determinative 
of the question in the conflict of laws.48 In recent years our courts have 
become somewhat aware of this fact, especially with respect to the 
statute of frauds.47 
Anglo-American law determines various questions in the conflict 
of laws with reference to the law of domicile. In most countries of the 
world a married woman takes at the time of marriage the domicile of 
her husband and her domicile follows that of the husband throughout 
the marriage.48 This rule was modified, however, in the United States 
by the middle of the last century in the matter of divorce, to the extent 
of its being recognized that a married woman who was justified in living 
apart from her husband could acquire a separate domicile for the pur-
pose of securing a divorce.49 The unitary concept of domicile as between 
husband and wife having once been broken, it was inevitable that a 
married woman should be allowed to acquire a separate domicile for 
45 See by CHEATHAM, DowLING, GooDRICH and GRISWOLD, CAsES AND MATE-
RIALS oN THE CoNFLICT oF LAws, 2d ed., 582-584- (194-1). 
48 Cook, "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," 4-2 YALE L. J. 
333 (1933). 
41 See Lams v. F. H. Smith Co., 6 W. W. Harr. (36 Del.) 4-77, 178 A. 651 
(1935). 
48 See Attorney-General for Alberta v. Cook, [I 926] A. C. 4-4-4-· 
4v Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 108 (1869). 
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other purposes than divorce. Thus it was held by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in 1915 ~o that she could do so for the purpose 
of bringing an action for damages against her husband in a federal 
court. Some courts took the position that as long as the marriage ties 
were in fact broken a married woman could have a separate domicile 
without respect to whether or not she was the guilty party in breaking 
up the home. ~1 One or two recent cases have taken the most advanced 
position to the effect that a wife takes the husband's domicile on mar-
riage no longer as a matter of law and that she may retain her old 
domicile by agreement with her husband.~2 
At common law legitimate children took the domicile of their 
father. This rule has been modified by modern statutes which confer 
upon the mother equal rights of guardianship and by the developments 
in our law regarding the capacity of a married woman to acquire a 
separate domicile from that of her husband. Children living with their 
mother are frequently held, therefore, to take the domicile of their 
mother.~3 They will continue to do so after the mother's remarriage, 
provided they continue to live with their mother.H 
The dogma, deeply rooted in Anglo-American law, that a person 
can have but one domicile has been challenged in recent times and it is 
said that a person may have different domiciles for different purposes. 
A troublesome question has arisen in recent years with regard to the in-
heritance taxation of intangible property when two or more states 
claimed the decedent to be domiciled in their state. Except in one case,~5 
in which four states imposed an inheritance tax, the total amount of 
which would consume the entire estate, the Supreme Court has declined 
to interfere.511 The only relief in sight at present seems to be the enact-
ment of state legislation providing for the voluntary submission of con-
troversies of this sort to arbitration.~1 
The law was settled in this country at the beginning of the century 
50 Williamson v. Osenton, Z3Z U. S. 619, 34- S. Ct. 4-4-Z (1913). 
G1 Saperstone v. Saperstone, 73 Misc. 631, 131 N.Y. S. z4-1 (1911); Chapman 
.v. Chapman, 1z9 Ill. 386, Zl N. E. 8o6 (1889). 
G2 Commonwealth v. Rutherfoord, 160 Va. 5z4, 169 S. E. 909 (1933). 
Ga CoNFLicT oF LAws REsTATEMENT, § 3z (1934). 
G4 Id., § 3 8, comment d. 
GGTexas v. Florida, 306 u.s. 398, 59 s. Ct. s63, 830 (1939)· 
Gs See In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (193z); 115 N. J. 
Eq. z68, 170 A. 601 (1934), cert. den. Z98 u.s. 678, s6 s. Ct. 949 (1936). 
GT Harper, "Final Determination of Domicil in the United States," 19 PA. B. 
A. Q. Zl3 (1934); reprinted in 9 IND. L. J. s86 (1934); z8 NAT. TAX AssN. CoNF. 
PRoc. zo1 (1935); Knapp, "Solutions of the Double Domicile Problem-History and 
Prospects," 15 CoNN. B. J. Z51 (1941). 
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that the law of the state in which a tort was committed, that is, where 
the injury or harm was done, determined the substantive rights of the 
parties.~8 In connection with wrongful death statutes the question has 
been debated whether the place of impact or that of the death should 
control. The law is now settled in favor of the former rule.119 Early in 
the century many courts professed to enforce claims arising under 
foreign wrongful death statutes only if there was a substantially similar 
statute at the forum. This similarity test has been abandoned today in 
practically all the states.~0 
The advent of the automobile has raised the problem whether the 
owner shall be held in accordance with the law of the place of the 
injury for damages caused by his auto when driven by a servant, a 
friend or a member of the family in a state other than the one in which 
the owner lived. In Young v Masci 61 the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that the owner should be liable if the auto was in 
the state in which the injury occurred with his express or implied con-
sent. Judge Learned Hand has interpreted Young v. Masci as holding 
that the owner would not be liable if the auto was taken into the other 
state without his consent.62 It would not be surprising, however, if the 
Supreme Court should hold that when an owner entrusts his auto to 
someone he takes the risk of its being taken to a state not contemplated 
by him, so as to be liable even in that event in accordance with the lex 
loci delicti. 
Workmen's compensation acts were unknown forty years ago. Now 
they exist in all states except Mississippi. At first the question was 
asked whether the legislation belonged to the law of torts or to the law 
of contracts. Today it is admitted that the application of these acts 
should not be determined on such a technical basis and that they should 
be construed to achieve the social purpose for which they were de-
signed. 68 The law has not crystallized as yet as to the means best 
calculated to attain this end. The tort theory has been generally aban-
58 In England an action will lie only if the facts constitute a tort under English 
law and the conduct was justifiable under the foreign law. Machado v. Fontes, [I 897] 
2 Q. B. 231, 66 L. J. (Q. B.) 542 (Court of Appeal). 
~0 See Vancouver Steamship Co. v. Rice, 288 U. S. 445, 53 S. Ct. 4-20 (1933). 
60 See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 224- N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 
(1918). 
~1 289 U.S. 253, 53 S. Ct. 599 (1933). 
62 Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 94-2. 
~3 Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 184- Cal. 26, 192 P. 
1021 (1920); Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 
32 Ariz. 275, 257 P. 64-4- (1927). 
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cloned. The so-called contract theory is numerically still prevailing, 
but other theories, such as that of the localization of business 64 or the 
localization of employment/5 have come to the front. The question 
under what circumstances the workmen's compensation act of one state 
is entitled to full faith and credit by the courts of another state came 
before the Supreme Court of the United States in 1932.66 The Court 
held that under the facts of the case the Vermont act was entitled to 
full faith and credit and that New Hampshire could not apply its own 
act, notwithstanding the fact that the injury had been received in New 
Hampshire. Since that time the Supreme Court has taken the position 
that any state whose public policy is sufficiently involved has the power 
to apply its own act. 67 
·In some states the employee who has accepted compensation under 
the workmen's compensation act may sue a third party who has caused 
the injury, the employer being subrogated to the extent of his pay-
ment. In others the employee is deprived of such cause of action but 
the employer may sue the third party in the name of the employee to 
recover to the extent of his outlay. Owing to such differences in legis-
lation, troublesome questions of subrogation have arisen which are not 
as yet worked out by the courts with any degree of clarity.68 
The subject of contracts has not advanced much beyond the state in 
which it was forty years ago. The early cases, in agreement with Story,6e 
held that the law of the lex loci contractus controlled except when the 
contract was to be performed elsewhere, when, in accordance with the 
presumed intention of the parties, the law of the place of performance 
would control. Professor Beale 70 has regarded this as an importation 
of continental ideas inconsistent with the principle of territoriality 
adopted by the common law, according to which the state in which a 
contract is technically made has exclusive power to attach legal con-
64 State ex rei. Chambers v. District Court of Hennepin County, I 39 Minn. 205, 
I66 N. W. 185 (I918). 
65 Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., 252 N.Y. 394, I69 N. E. 622 (I930). 
66 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, z86 U.S. I45> 52 S. Ct. 57I (I932). 
67 Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 55 
S. Ct. 5I8 (I935); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 306 U.S. 
493, 59 S. Ct. 629 (1939): 
68 See Dwan, "Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws," I I MINN. 
L. REv. 329 (1927); Dwan, "Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws-
The Restatement and Other Recent Developments," 20 MINN. L. REv. 19 (1935). 
69 CoNFLICT oF LAws RESTATEMENT, § 242 (1934). 
70 Beale, "What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract," 23 HARV. L. REv. 
I, 79 (1909), 194, z6o at 267-268, 270 (1910); z BEALE, CoNFLICT oF LAws, 
1078 et seq. (1935). 
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sequences to the operative facts. As Reporter of the Conflict of Laws 
for the American Law Institute, Professor Beale succeeded in making 
his views the basis of the Restatement. 71 This is most unfortunate. How 
can the manifold legal relations affecting the nature and validity of 
contracts of greatly varying types be brought within such a simple 
formula and be made dependent upon the frequently accidental cir-
cumstance regarding the last act which is deemed to make the agree-
ment a binding contract? The Supreme Court of the United States has 
been of no aid in the solution of this problem. In some cases it appears 
to follow Professor Beale's point of view 72 and in others, that of Story.78 
In usury cases, in agreement with most state decisions, it allows the 
parties to contract in good faith with reference to either the law of the 
place of making or the law of the place of performing. 74 There is no 
valid reason why this liberal principle should not be applied generally 
to the validity of contracts, at least where only conceptual differences 
are involved. As to matters not involving the validity of contracts, the 
parties ought to be allowed to choose the law of any state, although it 
has no connection with the operative facts of the case. 
For a while it seemed as if the Supreme Court of the United States 
would impose the Beale point of view as a matter of constitutional law 
in certain types of contracts, especially in matters of insurance/5 but in 
the light of its latest pronouncements this is "no longer clear. It seems 
that the law of the forum will be allowed to determine for itself where 
the contract is made and whether the law of some other state or country 
is applicable and, if it has a legitimate interest in the matter, it may 
decline to give effect to the foreign law on grounds of public policy.76 
Prior to I 906, the year in which the Carmack Amendment to the 
Interstate Commerce Act brought interstate shipments under federal 
control, conflicts questions regarding the validity of stipulations limit-
ing the liability of carriers came frequently before our courts. Similar 
questions arose also with regard to contracts made by telegraph com-
71 See CoNFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT, § 332 (I934-). 
72 See Scudder v. Union National Bank of Chicago, 9I U.S. 406 (I875). 
78 Hall v. Cordell, I42 U. S. I I6, I2 S. Ct. I 54 (I89I}; Pritchard v. Norton, 
I06 U.S. I24, I S. Ct. I02 (I882}. 
74 Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 4-03,4-7 S. Ct. 626 (I927). 
75 See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 38 S. Ct. 337 (I9I8}; 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U. S. 209, 4-2 S. Ct. 4-67 (I922); Aetna Life 
Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389, 4-5 S. Ct. I29 (I924); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 
28I U.S. 397, 50S. Ct. 338 (I930); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta 
& Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. I4-3, 54 S. Ct. 634- (I934); John Hancock Mutual Life 
Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. I78, 57 S. Ct. I29 (I936}. 
76 See Griffin v. McCoach, 3I3 U.S. 4-98, 6I S. Ct. I023 (I94I}. 
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panies prior to 1910 when an amendment to the Interstate Commerce 
Act subjected such contracts to federal law if during the course of trans-
mission a state line was crossed. Such stipulations against negligence 
were regarded as valid in some states and as invalid in others. If valid 
by the proper law, the courts of the forum might decline to give effect· 
to such stipulations on grounds of public policy, at least where the con-
tract was to be in part performed in the state of the forum or was 
breached there. 77 
The Harter Act in 1893 eliminated such problems with regard to 
maritime contracts of carriage by subjecting them to uniform federal 
legislation. This act was held inapplicable to contracts of passengers 
and their baggage and consequently with respect to them the above 
conflicts questions still remain. 78 
The political and economic upheavals following the First World 
War brought along in their train a multitude of novel questions in the 
conflict of laws, such as fluctuating exchange, 79 currency restrictions 80 
and moratory 81 or confiscatory legislation, 82 some of which have been 
difficult to deal with on the basis of the traditional rules of the conflict 
of laws. 
Rights in land have been subject in Anglo-American law since the 
earliest times to the law of the situs. As regards covenants in a deed 
and especially title covenants, there has existed considerable confusion 
which persists to the present day. From a realistic approach to the sub-
ject it would seem that title covenants, whether running with the land 
or not, should be governed by the law governing the title, that is the 
situs of the land. 83 Executory contracts relating to land are governed, 
of course, by the rules of the conflict of laws applicable to contracts, but 
77 See Ocean Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran, (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) 9 F. (2d) 
724. 
78 The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 22 S. Ct. 102 (1901); La Bourgogne, 
(C. C. A. 2d, 1906) 144 F. 781, affd. 210 U.S. 95, 28 S. Ct. 664 (1908). 
79 See Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U. S. 71, 46 S. Ct. 46 (1925); Deutsche Bank 
Filiale Nurenberg v. Humphrey, 272 U. S. 517, 47 S. Ct. 166 (1926); LoRENZEN, 
CASES AND MATERIALS oN CoNFLICT OF LAws, 4th ed., 499-500 and note (1937). 
8° Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemans & Halske Aktiengesellschaft, 
(D. C. N.Y. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 927. 
81 Bailey and Rice, "The Extraterritorial Effect of the New York Mortgage 
Moratorium," 20 CoRN. L. Q. 315 (1935); 36 CoL. L. REv. 487 (1936); 40 CoL. 
L. REv. 867 (1940). 
82 Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897 
(1934); see LoRENZEN, CAsEs AND MATERIALS oN THE CoNFLICT OF LAws, 4th ed., 
583-584, note (1937). 
83 See 9 CAL. L. REv. 234 (1921). 
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the law governing such contracts is as much in doubt today as it was 
forty years ago. 8 ' 
The law governing rights of property in chattels has been expressed 
for centuries by the maxim mobilia personam sequuntur, according to 
which movable property is deemed to follow the person of the owner 
and governed by the law of his domicile. In modern times personal 
property is frequently located permanently in a state other than that of 
the domicile of the owner and for that reason the claims of the law of 
the situs have asserted themselves more and more. By the beginning of 
the century it was held that the rights of third parties in chattels should 
be determined on the basis of their actual situs at the time of the trans-
action. 55 Today it is felt that property rights in chattels should be 
controlled by the law of the situs even between the parties. 86 Where 
the chattel has been removed to another state without the owner's con-
sent and the owner has not been negligent in not removing the same 
after knowledge of its presence there, the law is still unsettled as to 
whether the rights of the owner can be lawfully divested by the law of 
the situs.87 As title will pass in Anglo-American law as the result of 
mere agreement, there is generally no occasion to draw a sharp distinc-
tion between the contract and property aspects of the subject, and in 
the conflict of laws our courts have sometimes applied contract rules 
when property rights were involved, which should have been referred 
to the law of the situs.88 In the interest of greater simplicity, the law 
of domicile is still retained in determining rights in chattels in certain 
branches of the law, viz. in the matter of matrimonial property 89 and 
in the law of wills and intestate succession.90 
Questions involving the power of states to tax have come before the 
Supreme Court with ever-increasing frequency during the last forty 
years. In accordance with the maxim mobilia personam sequuntur, 
movable property was held to be taxable at the domicile of the owner. 
This rule was abandoned, however, by the Supreme Court with respect 
8-1See Polson v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 2II, 4-5 N. E. 737 (1897); Atwood v. 
Walker, 179 Mass. 514-, 61 N. E. 58 (1901); Meylink v. Rhea, 123 Iowa 310, 98 
N. W. 779 {1904-); Tillotson v. Prichard, 6o Vt. 94-, 14- A. 302 {1888). 
85 See MINoR, CoNFLICT oF LAws, § 129 (1901). 
86 See CoNFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT, § 258 (1934-). 
87 S •d § ee 1 ., 4-9, caveat. 
88 See Jewett, Inc. v. Keystone Drilling Co., 282 Mass. 4-69, 185 N. E. 369 
(1933)· 
89 CoNFLICT oF LAws REsTATEMENT, § 289 (1934-). 
90 Id., § 306 (wills); § 303 (distribution). 
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to chattels in r 90 5, 91 when it held that a property tax on chattels could 
be leviedpnly by the state in which they had their actual situs. Twenty 
years later the same doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court to 
inheritance taxation.92 As regards intangibles, including notes, bonds 
and stock certificates, the Supreme Court for a time tended to support 
the view that only the state of the decedent's domicile could impose an 
inheritance tax, 93 but during the last few years the Supreme Court has 
receded from its former position. 94 
Marriage, which is based upon contract, creates a status. As ques-
tions of status are said to be governed in Anglo-American law by the 
law of the domicile of the parties, it would follow that the law of the 
domicile of each party should determine whether the status has been 
created. In this country, however, it has been customary for persons 
who cannot get married under the law of their respective domiciles to 
go to a state where they can get married, and to return immediately 
after the marriage. Our courts have gone very far in sanctioning such 
evasions by looking at marriage from the contract point of view and 
therefore holding that the law of the place of celebration controls. In 
certain types of cases in which local feelings were involved the courts of 
the domicile of the parties whose law had been evaded have held such 
marriages to be invalid on grounds of public policy,95 but they would 
be valid in all other states.96 Attempts have been made to check such 
evasion by legislation, notably in the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act,97 
but these legislative efforts have met with little success. The Restate-
91 Union Refrigeration Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 S. Ct. 36 
(1905)· 
92 Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603 (1925). See also City 
Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U. S. 112, 55 S. Ct. 29 (1934). The 
question whether a tax might be levied at the business situs was reserved. 
93 Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 50S. Ct. 98 (1930); 
Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436 (1930); First National Bank of 
Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 174 (1932). 
94 See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900 (1939); Graves v. 
Elliott, 307 U. S. 383, 59 S. Ct. 913 (1939); Stewart v. Pennsylvania, 312 U. S. 
649, 61 S. Ct. 445 (1941). 
95 See Johnson v. Johnson, 57 Wash. 89, 106 P. 500 (1910); In re Stull's 
Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 A. 16 (1898). 
96 Hall v. Industrial Commission, 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312 (1917), held 
that a marriage contracted in evasion of the Illinois law and valid in the state in which 
it was celebrated was invalid in Wisconsin, on the specific ground that Wisconsin had 
similar legislation to that of Illinois against evasion and under such circumstances felt 
it to be its duty to support the policy of the sister state. The court recognized that it 
was going a step further than that of any case brought to its attention. 
97 The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act has been adopted in only five states 
(Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Vermont and Wisconsin). 
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ment of the Conflict of Laws has tried to fit our law into the status 
theory of marriage by providing that where a marriage will not be 
recognized by the law of the domicile of either party it shall be re-
garded as void everywhere.98 
Evasion of the law of the matrimonial domicile has reached vast 
proportions in recent years in matters of divorce. With the recognition 
of the wife's capacity to acquire a separate domicile for purposes of 
divorce, both spouses were enabled to establish their domicile in a state 
having the most liberal divorce laws and obtain a divorce there on 
grounds recognized by the law of the forum. Although vigorous at-
tempts have been made to check the migratory divorce evil by legisla-
tion, nothing has been accomplished, the Uniform Annulment of Mar-
riage and Divorce Act having been adopted in only three states.99 
Most of the courts 100 still maintain that for the recognition of a foreign 
divorce decree the court granting the same must have had jurisdiction 
over the subject matter, i.e., the status, which requires domicile. In 
recent years collateral attack upon foreign divorces, admittedly void 
because of the absence of domicile, has been unsuccessful in many cases 
because it was deemed inequitable for the attacking party to raise the 
issue.101 According to this doctrine, the party invoking the jurisdiction 
of the court may not later deny its jurisdiction, nor, according to some 
decisions, may the libellee appearing in the suit or who subsequently 
remarries.102 
When the parties have tried the issue of domicile, the finding is 
binding upon all courts as res judicata.103 Divorces rendered by courts 
of sister states are entitled to full faith and credit if both spouses were 
domiciled in the state, or their last matrimonial domicile was in the 
state, 104 or if the libellant was domiciled in the state and the libellee was 
98 CoNFLICT oF LAws REsTATEMENT, § 132 (1934-). 
99 In Delaware, New Jersey and Wisconsin. 
100 Howe, "The Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York State," 
4-0 CoL. L. REV. 373 (194-0), contends that the New York courts have never com-
mitted themselves to the status theory of divorce. This accounts for the fact that they 
have recognized foreign divorces although neither spouse had a domicile in the state 
where both parties were before the court. Gould v. Gould, 235 N. Y. 14-, 138 N. E. 
4-90 (1923); Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N. Y. 296, 12 N. E. (2d) 305 (1938). 
101 See Harper, "The Validity of Void Divorces," 79 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 158 
(1930); Harper, "The Myth of the Void Divorce," 2 LAw & CoNTEM. PRoB. 335 
(1935)· 
102 For a more detailed statement, see LoRENZEN, CAsEs AND MATERIALS oN CoN-
FLICT OF LAws, 4-th ed., 783-784- (1937). 
103 Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3 (1938). 
104 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 54-4- (1901). 
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personally before the court. In other cases the courts of the different 
states are free to recognize the foreign decree or not.105 The Restate-
ment/06 following Beale, 107 attempts to give a new interpretation to the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Haddock 
case and to restrict the voluntary recognition of the foreign decree by 
the individual states in the same manner. The apparent simplification 
of the law of divorce suggested by the new formulation would seem, 
however, to be an illusion, in view of the fact that it makes fault a 
jurisdictional issue which would lead to greater diversity of decisions 
than that existing at the present time.108 
The loosening of marriage ties during the last forty years, resulting 
in an ever-increasing number of divorces, has created new problems also 
regarding alimony and the custody of children. As regards alimony 
decrees, it is now settled that they are entitled to full faith and credit 
as final judgments, provided the amount accrued cannot be changed 
by the court rendering the decree.109 In the past alimony has been 
associated with divorce proceedings. However, the fact that today a 
husband may obtain, without knowledge of the wife, a divorce which 
will be recognized in many states has compelled the courts to dissociate 
divorce and alimony and to allow the divorced wife under certain 
circumstances to bring an independent suit for alimony.110 
The jurisdiction of courts to award the custody of children is still 
based upon two antagonistic principles. One is that jurisdiction to 
award the custody of children exists at their domicile 111 and the other, 
that a court having jurisdiction to award the custody of a child retains 
jurisdiction to modify its award although the domicile of a child has 
been changed in the meanwhile to another state.112 
The rules governing legitimacy, legitimation and adoption as they 
105 See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525 (1906). 
106 CoNFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT, § II3 (1934), which reads in part, "A 
state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of spouses of 
whom one is domiciled in the state and the other is domiciled outside the state, if (a) 
the spouse who is not domiciled in the state (i) has consented that the other spouse 
acquire a separate home; or (ii) by his or her misconduct has ceased to have the right 
to object to the acquisition of such separate home ...• " 
107 Beale, "Haddock Revisited," 39 HARv. L. REv. 417 (1926). 
108 McClintock, "Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction," 37 YALE L. J. 
564 (1928); Bingham, "The American Law Institute vs. the Supreme Court in the 
Matter of Haddock v. Haddock," 21 CoRN. L. Q. 393 (1936). 
109 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. I, 30 S. Ct. 682 (1910). 
110 See Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 977 (1910). 
111 CoNFLICT oF LAws RESTATEMENT, § 146 (1934). 
112 Stetson v. Stetson, So Me. 483, 15 A. 6o {1888); Griffin v. Griffin, 95 Ore. 
78, 187 P. 598 (1920). 
HeinOnline  -- 40 Mich. L. Rev.  799 1941-1942
DEVELOPMENTS IN CoNFLICTs 799 
exist today were developed in the main prior to I 900. We have no 
decisions as yet determining what law governs legitimation from birth. 
As regards rights of inheritance by adopted children, the Supreme 
Court of Kansas held in I 909 113 that they were derived from the status, 
and were governed, therefore, by the law of the state where the adop-
tion took place. This holding was overruled in I 92 7,114 so that it is 
now established without dissent that rights of inheritance are governed 
by the law governing the succession to the particular property, movable 
or immovable. The adopted child has been held, however, to retain 
his rights of inheritance against his natural parents when the local law 
of the state of adoption had not cut off such rights but the local law 
governing the inheritance would do so.115 
As regards intestate succession, wills and the administration of 
estates, no important developments have taken place during the last 
forty years. The construction and interpretation of wills is still said to 
be governed by the law of the testator's domicile at the time of the 
execution of the will.11c So far as the question relates to land, it is evi-
dent that the rule should have no application when the law of the situs 
attaches an absolute meaning to the words used by the testator. The 
law of the situs should govern also if it uses a presumption which is 
rebuttable only by admissible evidence showing an actual intention to 
the contrary on the part of the testator.111 This is also the position taken 
by the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws.118 
Testamentary trusts in movable property are said to be governed 
by the law of the testator's domicile.119 The New York courts have 
sustained them, however, in certain instances where the trust was to be 
administered under the law of another state the law of which did not 
object to the administration of such trusts, although the trust was in-
valid under the local law of New Y ork.120 By statute it is provided 
also in New York that effect shall be given to a declaration by the 
testator that his will shall be construed in accordance with the law 
of New Y ork.121 
113 Boaz v. Swinney, 79 Kan. 332, 99 P. 621 (1909). 
114 In re Riemann's Estate, 124- Kan. 539, 262 P. 16 (1927). 
115 Slattery v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., I 15 Conn. 163, 161 A. 79 
(1932). . 
116 See Higinbotham v. Manchester, 113 Conn. 62, 154- A. 24-2 (1931). 
117 Heilman, "Interpretation and Construction of Wills of Immovables in Con-
flict of Laws Cases Involving 'Election,'" 25 ILL. L. REv. 778 (1931). 
118 CoNFLICT oF LAws RESTATEMENT, § 251 (1934-). 
119 Id. § 295. 
120 Hope v. Brewer, 136 N. Y. 126, 32 N. E. 558 (1892). 
121 13 N.Y. Laws (McKinney 1939), "Decedent Estate Law," § 4-7· 
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In the administration of estates there still exist many difficulties 
which the Restatement has attempted to iron out.122 By adopting the 
mercantile theory regarding bills, notes and certificates of stock it has 
sought to place the law upon a basis harmonizing best with the status 
of these instruments in the business world. A less progressive spirit is 
shown on the other hand by the Restatement when it recognizes a 
distinction between executors and administrators, according to which 
no privity exists as between administrators, whereas such privity does 
exist between executors in different states where there is identity of 
person.123 
DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER CouNTRIES 
The above survey gives some idea of the development of the con-
flict of laws in the United States during the last forty years. Let us 
now consider briefly what has happened in the meanwhile in the rest 
of the world. 
Forty years ago was the era of the Hague Conventions on the con-
flict of laws. It was felt that the time was ripe for an attempt to pro-
vide an international basis for the rules of the conflict of laws. The 
first effort in the direction of securing identity of rules in the different 
continental countries was in the matter of civil procedure (judicial 
assistance), status, matrimonial property rights and bankruptcy. The 
Conventions on Civil Procedure of r899 and I905 were ratified by 
many continental countries. Conventions relating to marriage, divorce, 
separation and guardianship were concluded in I920 and were ratified 
by several states. Draft conventions on succession and wills, the effect 
of marriage upon the rights and duties of married persons in their 
personal relations and upon their property, interdiction and similar 
measures and bankruptcy were agreed upon at the Hague in I905 but 
never reached the convention stage/24 The above attempts at the uni-
fication of the conflict of laws did not, however, measure up to the ex-
pectations that had been entertained. They were elaborated by official 
delegates from the various governments represented who came under 
specific instructions. This meant that no agreement could be attained 
except upon the basis of many compromises, exceptions and reservations, 
which largely nullified the general objective-uniformity. This situa-
tion was aggravated by the fact that, following in the footsteps of the 
Italian and German legislators, the conventions adopted nationality 
122 CoNFLICT oF LAws RESTATEMENT, §§ 506 (z), 510 (2) (1934-). 
123 Id., §§ 510, 511. 
124 For an English translation of these conventions and drafts, see LoRENZEN, 
CAsEs oN THE CoNFLICT oF LAws, Ist ed., Appendix (1909). 
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as the governing principle in matters of status and the like, instead of 
domicile, the effect of which was so untoward in France that it felt 
compelled to denounce the conventions. 
Disappointed by these efforts, no further attempts were made on 
the continent to promote general conventions on the subject of the 
conflict of laws. Interest in the unification of law thereupon shifted 
to the field of commercial law. In I9I2 an international convention 
was signed at the Hague on the subject of bills of exchange. This was 
not ratified, however, by any of the signatory states, due in part at 
least to the outbreak of the First World War. This convention con-
tained a few articles on the conflict of laws.125 More recent develop-
ments in the direction of securing uniformity in the conflict of laws took 
place at Geneva, the seat of the League of Nations. In 1923 the Geneva 
Protocol on Arbitration Clauses was signed providing for the compul-
sory recognition of arbitration agreements by the contracting states.126 
It was supplemented by the Geneva Convention for the Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927,127 which has been ratified by many 
states and has been substantially put into effect in England by the 
Arbitration (Foreign Awards) Act of 1930. 
In 1930 many continental countries entered into the Geneva Con-
vention on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, and in I93I into 
a similar convention on the law of checks, in connection with each of 
which separate conventions were concluded for the settlement of cer-
tain conflict of laws problems.128 Although the above conventions re-
lating to the conflict of laws applicable to bills, notes and checks con-
tained various compromises and reservations, they constitute a forward 
step in promoting uniformity in the conflict of laws of the different 
countries. 
The movement for the unification,of the conflict of laws among the 
Latin-American states antedated the continental efforts by many years. 
Nine of the Latin-American states agreed at Lima in 1878 upon a 
125 For an English translation of this Convention, see LoRENZEN, CoNFLICT OF 
LAws RELATING To BILLS AND NoTEs, Appendix (1919). 
126 For the text of the conventions, see League of Nations Publications, 1928.II.s, 
(Economics & Finance). The text may be found also in RussELL, ARBITRATION AND 
AwARD, 12th ed. (Aronson) 336 (1931) and in NussBAUM, INTERNATIONAL YEAR-
BOOK oN CiviL AND CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 239 (1928). 
127 For the text (in French) of the convention, see 2 NussBAUM, lNTER-
NATIONALES jAHRBUCH FUR ScHIEDSGERICHTSWESEN IN ZIVIL- AND HANDELSSACHEN 
237 (1928). 
128 For the text of these conventions in English, as well as of conventions on 
stamp laws relating to bills, notes and checks entered into at the same time. see LoREN-
ZEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNFLICT OF LAws, 4th ed., 578 (1937). 
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general treaty on the conflict of laws, which was not ratified, however, 
by any of the states. Eleven years later (I 8 8 9) another attempt was 
made at Montevideo. Various treaties were concluded at that time re-
lating to international civil law, international commercial law, inter-
national criminal law and international procedural law, which were 
ratified by Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. Colombia 
adhered to the Treaty on International Procedural Law in I920. 
The work of unifying the conflict of laws, initiated at the Second 
Pan-American Conference in the city of Mexico in I90I, was inter-
rupted by the First World War, but was resumed in I924 when the 
American Institute of International Law, meeting at Lima, appointed 
a commission, including Dr. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante of 
Havana, Cuba, to draw up a code of private international law. Dr. 
Bustamante's draft was adopted at the Sixth Pan-American Conference, 
held in Havana in I928, with the official title of "Code Bustamante." 129 
Like the Convention of Montevideo of I 8 89, the Code Bustamante 
consists of four parts, entitled respectively International Civil Law, 
International Commercial Law, International Criminal Law and In-
ternational Law of Procedure. The code was ratified by and is now in 
force in the following Latin-American countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. As 
neither Argentina nor Brazil were willing to yield with respect to the 
fundamental question whether the "personal law" should be determined 
by nationality or domicile, Brazil having embraced the doctrine of 
nationality and Argentina adhering to the traditional notion of domi-
cile, the Code Bustamante provides simply that each state shall remain 
free to adopt either/30 
In commemoration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the South Ameri-
can Congress of Private International Law, held at Montevideo in 
I889, a Second South American Congress of Private International Law 
was held in Montevideo in I939 and I940 for the purpose of revising 
the earlier treaties. These new treaties were signed by Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. Brazil signed all 
except the one on International Civil Law.131 
129 See BusTAMANTE, LA CoMMISSION DES JuRISCONSULTES DE Rio DE jANEIRO 
ET LE DRoiT INTERNATIONAL I (1928); Lorenzen, "The Pan-American Code of 
Private International Law," 4 TuLANE L. REV. 499 (1930). 
1
8° Code Bustamante, art. 7· 
131 Segundo Congreso Sudamericano de Derecho Internacional Privado de Mon-
tevideo, 1939-1940 (1940). 
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Since the year I 8 8 I the conflict of laws has been an obligatory sub-
ject of study at all French law schools. At that time a chair for that 
subject exclusively was established at the University of Paris. This 
step of the French Government stimulated interest in the conflict of 
laws in France and made the French writers leaders in this field. Im-
portant works on the conflict of laws have appeared during the last 
forty years in many countries, including Latin America.182 The grow-
ing interest in the conflict of laws during the same period and especially 
since the First World War is evidenced also by the increased number 
of reviews devoting themselves exclusively or in part to the conflict 
of laws and in the establishment of institutes specializing in the study 
of that subject. The Institute of Comparative Law at Berlin has pub-
lished from 1928 to 1935 an annual volume containing the decisions 
of the German courts on the conflict of laws during the preceding year, 
and the Institute of Legislative Studies of Rome from I937-1939, five 
volumes annotating current decisions of the conflict of laws of the 
leading countries of the world. 
Attention may be called also to other activities in the field of the 
conflict of laws. With the aid of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace the Hague Academy of International Law was estab-
lished, under whose auspices lectures on different phases of the conflict 
of laws have been delivered during the months of July and August of 
each year, since 1923, by distinguished jurists from all parts of the 
world. These lectures have been published in the Recueil des Cours, 
of which sixty-six volumes have appeared to date. In France an En-
cyclopedia of International Law, both public and private, edited by 
Professors de Lapradelle and Niboyet, was published between 1929 
and 1931 in ten volumes, including the conflict of laws of the different 
countries of the world. It was the intention of the publishers to bring 
the encyclopedia up to date by supplements of which the first appeared 
in I934· In 1934 the Comite Fran~ais de Droit International Prive 
was organized in Paris for the purpose of re-examining the fundamental 
doctrines of the French conflict of laws. This committee has met regu-
larly and published the results of its deliberations. 
Professor Rabel, formerly director of the Institute of Comparative 
Law of Berlin, Germany, is engaged at the present time in the laborious 
task of ascertaining the extent to which the rules laid down in the 
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws by the American Law Institute 
132 An exhaustive bibliography may be found in I BEALE, CoNFLICT oF LAws, 
xvii-cxii (1935). 
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find support in the positive law of the continental and Latin-American 
countries. 
· All this denotes progress. As a result a better understanding has 
been gained of the practical operation of the rules of the conflict of 
· laws in the different countries. This is not to say, however, that the 
world is ready for the unification of these rules by international agree-
ment. Complete uniformity is, of course, an ideal which in the realm 
of finite law will remain forever unattainable. The best to be hoped for 
is a greater degree of uniformity. Even this will require much effort, 
patience and good will. The work must begin, as it has, with countries 
having the same institutions and legal background. If at the conclu-
sion of the present World War a United States of Europe should 
emerge, progressive steps for the unification of the rules of the con-
flict of laws may be expected. The experience derived from the Hague 
and Geneva Conventions should have taught the continental countries 
valuable lessons from which they may greatly profit when the further 
unification of their rules of the conflict of laws is to be undertaken. The 
Latin-American countries have already a code ~f private international 
law-the Code Bustamante. The provisions of this code require further 
amplification and revision to be an effective guide for the solution of 
the problems in the conflict of laws among the Latin-American states, 
but when these are made, the adoption of the Code Bustamante by all 
Latin-American countries may follow. As for the countries of the com-
mon law, there exists at the present moment considerable uniformity in 
the rules of the conflict of laws. It is not unlikely, therefore, that before 
many years there will exist three large groups of countries in which the 
rules of the conflict of laws have attained substantial uniformity-the 
Continental, the Latin-American and the Anglo-American. 
Whether greater uniformity is attainable between these groups, 
especially between the Anglo-American and the others, remains to be 
seen.183 Professor Rabel is of the opinion that the present rules of the 
conflict of laws, derived as they are from the internal law of the dif-
ferent countries, can never operate harmoniously in their application 
to countries with different legal institutions. He contends, therefore, 
that the traditional rules of the conflict of laws require restatement and 
must be framed in more general terms derived by the comparative 
method from the different legal systems of the world. This would 
183 We have seen that no agreement could be reached on the question whether 
the "personal law" should be determined with reference to domicile or nationality. 
Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay have failed to ratify the Con-
vention, and of the fifteen countries that have ratified, eight did so with reservations. 
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appear to be the scientific way of resolving the difficulties presented 
today in situations where the conflict of laws rules of the forum have as 
their background legal institutions of which there is no direct counter-
part in the country whose law is to be applied. It would be well if 
scholars such as Professor Rabel would develop the comparative 
method in the field of the conflict of laws to a point where the results 
can be utilized by the courts. Until that time our courts will have to 
be content to use the traditional methods in dealing with the problems 
of the conflict of laws. There is some indication that our courts are 
prepared to adopt a somewhat more realistic approach in conflicts situa-
tions. The immediate hopes for the further development of the con-
flict of laws in this country would seem to lie in this direction. 
